Nedan delar ur en rapport från The Soufan Group (soufangroup.com) där det framkommer vilka som åker till Syrien för att medverka i det ”heliga” kriget, varifrån de kommer och varför de åker dit. En intressant rapport som kan läsas i sin helhet på följande länk: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf
KEY FINDINGS
• The Syrian war is likely to be an incubator for a new generation of terrorists.
• Over 12,000 foreign fighters have gone to Syria since the 3-year conflict began, more than traveled to Afghanistan during its ten-year war and violent aftermath. And they continue to arrive.
• Foreign fighters have gone to Syria from at least 81 countries and from all parts of the globe.
• About 3,000 foreign fighters are from Western countries.
• Motivation for going varies, but the ‘jihadist’ narrative is common among those who are joining extremist groups – and they make up the majority.
• The three groups that have attracted the most foreign fighters, despite the in-fighting between them, are Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS). All these were founded by people who at the time were members of al-Qaeda. These groups tend to be more inclusive, better organized, and better financed than their more moderate counterparts.
• The al-Qaeda leadership has taken a close interest in Syria, seeing it as an opportunity to recover from the hammering it has suffered since 2001, and it has sent senior operatives there to work with and influence affiliated groups.
• Leaving aside what may happen in Syria, if al-Qaeda can maintain a network of even a small number of motivated returnees, or recruit fighters to its terrorist agenda while they are still in Syria, it may once more pose a significant global threat.
• Some of the foreign fighters may not return as terrorists to their respective countries, but all of them will have been exposed to an environment of sustained radicalization and violence with unknowable but worrying consequences. An attack by a returned fighter in Brussels in May is one example.
• Advances in technology, communications, travel, and tactics (from a decade of fighting in the region) mean that even a very small percentage of returning foreign fighters could have a major impact on their homelands.
• National resources in most countries are insufficient to monitor more than a handful of returnees.
• Lessons from Afghanistan argue for more attention to the possible fall out from the Syrian war.
• The influx of fighters joining al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria raises questions about the effectiveness of the work that has gone into undermining the appeal of terrorism since 2001, and the general understanding of its causes.
• A new Afghanistan in the Levant? Unfortunately, as Syria becomes more permanently divided, extremist groups will put down deeper roots and establish safe havens. A further danger grows in the countries that play
host to Syrian refugees. The longer young people spend in refugee camps, or otherwise displaced from home and school, the more vulnerable they will be to sectarian or other terrorist recruiters.
Social Media’s Influence on Syrian Foreign Fighters and Extremist Ideology:Social media such as Twitter or Facebook are highly effective in spreading a violent extremist ideology. They play a significant role in the recruitment and fundraising efforts of extremist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra.
But three factors are often overlooked that any counter-radical campaign will need to understand and leverage:
• The power of instantaneous and ubiquitous communication can also divide the extremist groups, much as is happening with ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra. They are increasingly fighting each other using the same social
media that brought them earlier prominence. Al Nusra and the al-Qaeda leadership tend to speak in Arabic on Twitter and Facebook, while ISIS uses multiple languages in their outreach to supporters.
• Different regions consume different social media. The target audience of young people in the Levant is overwhelmingly found through Facebook; in the Gulf it is more likely to be reached through Twitter.
• Regardless of platform, the target audience (young and emotionally engaged) does not get news or information about the war from traditional sources. Potential foreign fighters are interconnected within self-selected bubbles, and are isolated from anything outside .Policymakers often underestimate the impact of what is happening in these
closed circles even as they overestimate the impact of their own.
SUMMARYOver 12,000 fighters from at least 81 countries have joined the civil war in Syria, and the numbers continue to grow. Around 2,500 are from Western countries, including most members of the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. There are also several hundred from Russia. But the great majority are from the Arab World.
Most are fighting with rebel groups, and increasingly with the most extreme among them; but many are also fighting with the Government, or with ethnic or faith communities that are trying to protect themselves from both sides. A lot are young, often teenagers, and a fair percentage of those arriving from non-Muslim majority countries are converts to Islam. These and others who share their faith commonly express their motivation as a religious obligation to protect fellow Muslims from attack. This sense of duty is captured by their loose use of the word ‘jihad’.
There is considerable international concern at what these young men – and some women – will do once they leave Syria, and although almost all appear (from interviews and the evidence of social media) to go without a thought of what next, the experience of being in a war zone and exposed to the radicalizing influences of sectarianism and other forms of extremism are bound to have an impact on their ability and willingness to resume their
former lives.
The policy response so far has often focused more on prevention and punishment than on dissuasion or reintegration, but as the number of returnees increases, and the resources required to monitor their activities are stretched to breaking point, it will be important to examine more closely why an individual went, what happened to him while there, and why he came back. This paper attempts to provide some general context for answering those questions, and offers suggestions for policy development.
Bild nedan (Vilka länder som levererar soldater till Syrien)
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Algeria: about 200 (Official estimate, May 2014, plus up to 200 helpers) |
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Australia: about 250 (ASIS, April 2014) |
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Belgium: about 250 (Official figure, April 2014, 200 still in Syria) |
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Canada: 30 (CSIS, February 2014) |
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Denmark: 100 (PET, May 2014) |
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Finland: over 30 (Supo, March 2014) |
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France: over 700 (Official figure, April 2014, 275 still in Syria) |
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Germany: 270 (BfV, January 2014, ‘about 300’ March 2014) |
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Indonesia: 30 – 60 (Official estimate, May 2014) |
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Ireland : 25 – 30 (Ministry of Justice, February 2014) |
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Kosovo:100 – 120 (OSCE report, March 2014) |
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Kyrgyzstan: 10+ (Krygyz Security Service, May 2013) |
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Morocco: about 1,500 (Official figure, April 2014) |
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The Netherlands: 120 (Ministry of Justice, February 2014) |
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Norway: 40 – 50 (NIS, February 2014) |
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Russian Federation: over 800 (FSB, April 2014) |
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Saudi Arabia: about 2,500 (Official estimate, May 2014; 1,200 MoI) |
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Singapore: one (Official figure, March 2014) |
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Spain: 51 (Official figure, April 2014) |
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Sweden: about 30 (Säpo, April 2013) |
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Switzerland: about 10 (Swiss Intelligence Service, May 2013) |
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Tunisia: about 3,000 (Official figure, April 2014) |
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Turkey: about 400 (Official estimate, April 2014) |
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United Kingdom: about 400 (Official estimate, March 2014) |
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United States: 70+ (FBI, May 2014) |